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FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND
VOTERS’ CHOICES AS CONTROL
ALBERTO PORTO AND NATALIA PORTO*
National University of La Plata
This paper investigates, empirically, the voters’ choices as a mechanism of control of the
municipal governments in Argentina. In particular, the paper explores the question of
whether voters choose to support the political party in office based on its fiscal performance
while in office. After a learning period, citizens vote considering the fiscal performance.
The smaller the jurisdiction, the more sensitive the citizens. Voters, in evaluating fiscal
performance to take voting decisions, consider the performance in the recent past. Municipal
elections are not a mere rehearsal of national or provincial elections. We conclude that we
can trust in fiscal decentralization and voting. Perhaps, it is a better option than fiscal
centralization.
JEL classification codes: H72 - D72
Key words: fiscal decentralization, local governments, fiscal performance, voters’
choices
I. Introduction
Fiscal decentralization plays a crucial role both in public finance theory and in
the design and evaluation of fiscal policies. At the theoretical level, there is no
agreement on the most important issues about fiscal decentralization or on the real
*We would like to thank G. Porto, J. Remes Lenicov, E. Rezk and W. Sosa Escudero for
their useful and wise comments. Very challenging and thought-provoking too were the
comments from L. Feld at the 55th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance
in Moscow and from J. Streb at the XXXIV Anual Meeting of the Asociación Argentina
de Economía Política in Rosario. We would also like to thank the comments of all the
participants of the Department of Economics Seminars at the National University of La
Plata. The usual disclaim applies.
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functioning of the multilevel governments.1 In this paper we empirically investigate
on ballot box as a mechanism of control of fiscal variables. We analyze the case of
125 municipal governments in the Province of Buenos Aires in Argentina, where
12,5 million people live (census 1991). For decades civil and military governments
have alternated in our country. Since 1983 democracy prevails and since then
1 A few examples are the following:
“The federal system was created with the intention of combining the different advantages
which result from the magnitude and the littleness of nations” (Alexis de Tocqueville:
Democracy in America);
“The optimum form of government: a federal system” (W. E. Oates: Federalismo Fiscal);
“Decentralization can jeopardize stability,” “Decentralization can undermine efficiency,”
“Decentralization can (...) be the mother of segregation,” “corruption is more widespread
at the local than at national level” (Remy Prud’homme: The Dangers of Decentralization);
“and it does seem enough to call for a revision in the conventional wisdom that stabilization
should not be a state responsability” (E. M. Gramlich: Federalism and Federal Deficit
Reduction);
“Properly applied, the conventional theory of decentralization can help improve the
enactment and execution of government policy,” “It takes a great deal of production
efficiency, which Prud’homme says is an advantage of centralization, to offset a central
government choice to waste resources on activities that are harmful to the populace” (military,
palaces or anything else of low priority to the populace) (Ch.E.Mc Lure Jr (Comment on
Prud’homme));
“I find it quite appropriate that subnational governments should participate in redistribution,
as they do in practice; (...) Some participation by subnational governments in stabilization
policy is also sensible. Finally, the case for decentralization is fundamentally based on
efficiency considerations.” (D. O. Sewell (Comment on Prud’homme));
“on the assumption that people should get what they want -rather than someone else wants
them to want (...) decentralization is in principle a plus, not a minus.” “Nonetheless,
decentralization is still a good idea” (Bird and Rodriguez: Decentralization and Poverty
Alleviation).
“Federal decentralization, and in particular local autonomy, is another constitutional element
which can be hypothesized to positively affect citizens` happiness. Political decision making
in municipalities is closer to relevant information about residents` preferences and also
closer to direct control by its citizens” (Frey and Stutzer: Happiness, Economy and
Institutions).
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there have been four municipal elections. This fact has raised the intriguing question
of whether ballot box is an efficient mechanism to control fiscal variables.
In Section II we review three models of fiscal decentralization, namely “vote
with their feet” as in Tiebout, concentration of the fiscal decision power as in
political economy models, and the ballot box. Section III studies some conditions
for the functioning of fiscal decentralization in practice. Section IV presents results
about the relationship between election outcomes and fiscal performance for
Argentina. Section V concludes.
The results of this paper, though preliminary, suggest that fiscal decentralization
and ballot box plus mobility of goods and factors could make fiscal centralization
less necessary than political economy models and several attempts of creating
new fiscal institutions in Argentina have suggested.
II. Models of Fiscal Decentralization
One of the first developments in this field is Tiebout (1956). This model arises
as an answer to Samuelson (1954,1955) who, in his extension of welfare theory to
incorporate public goods, concludes that “the “solution” exists; the problem is
how to find it.” The “solution” requires that the summation of the marginal rates
of substitution over all members of the community be equated to the marginal rate
of transformation. A competitive market fails and the quantity of public goods
provided is likely to be less than the Pareto-optimal quantity (Laffont, 1988;
Mueller, 1989). According to Tiebout, it is necessary to distinguish between national
or federal public goods –for which Samuelson’s result applies- and local public
goods for which there is a mechanism that functions “like the market” and yields
the same optimal solution that a private market would. The Tiebout consumer-
voter may be visualized as choosing among several communities with already set
revenue and expenditure patterns and picking that community which best satisfies
his preference pattern for public goods. Mobility –“vote with their feet”- is the
mechanism that yields the provision of the optimal bundle of goods at the minimum
cost. In Tiebout`s words (1956: 422): “just as the consumer may be visualized as
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walking to a private market place to buy his goods, the prices of which are set, we
place him in the position of walking to a community where the prices (taxes) of
community services are set. Both trips take the consumer to market. There is no
way in which the consumer can avoid revealing his preferences in a spatial economy.
Spatial mobility provides the local public-goods counterpart to the private market’s
shopping trip”. A practical implication of the analysis is that policies that promote
mobility and increase the knowledge of the consumer-voter will improve the
allocation of public expenditures. Tiebout (1956: 424) concludes that the “local
government represents a sector where the allocation of public goods (as a reflection
of the preferences of the population) need not take a back seat to the private sector.”
Information, knowledge, interjurisdictional competition and mobility are the keys
of the model.
In its over four decades of life, Tiebout’s paper has generated a wealth of
literature, both theoretical and empirical.2  It could not have been different because
it is a very short paper (only eight pages) without mathematics or figures, with
strong assumptions and not well clarified issues. We would like to emphasize two
points about the paper. The first is about Tiebout’s mechanism for obtaining
economic efficiency, that is, the mobility of the consumer-voter (“vote with their
feet”) and the later extension to goods and productive factors.3 The second is that,
in the presence of fiscal disparities among regions, fiscal decentralization should
include a mechanism for transferring financial resources from wealthy to poor
regions (Buchanan, 1950; Oates, 1972). Similar to a world where only private
goods exist, the solution arising from competition is efficient but not necessarily
2 An example is Zodrow (ed.) (1983). The theoretical and empirical literature has grown
considerably until now; for references see Oates (1994).
3 Migrations have been important in Argentina. For example, between 1914 and 1947
immigrate 850.000 people from other parts of the country into Capital Federal and the
Province of Buenos Aires. Between 1947 and 1960 more than 1,1 million people immigrated
to the Province of Buenos Aires. The net migration of natives between 1914 and 1947,
between Provinces, both in absolute values and in relation with the population of 1914,
could be explained by the differences of "economic capacity" and the "per capita provincial
expenditures" (Ennis and Porto, 1997).
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fair. “Thus, our analysis suggests that we should applaud interjurisdictional
competition on efficiency grounds whenever the federal government has fulfilled
the redistributive function” (Oates and Schwab, 1991: 128).
An alternative approach to Tiebout can be found in the literature focusing on
the political and institutional determinants of fiscal results (Alesina et.al., 1995;
Alesina y Perotti, 1996; Stein et.al., 1997; Velasco, 1997). The essence of this
approach can be freely outlined as follows: when there are several levels of
government and revenue sharing systems, revenues become “common property”
at various levels. On this “common property” influence fiscal and political
institutions leading to intergovernmental grants higher than optimal, excessive
local public goods, inadequate local tax effort, fiscal deficits, excessive public
debt, etc. All of these probably end in macroeconomic calamities (e.g. high inflation
or hyperinflation). The implicit or explicit message of this approach seems to be
that fiscal decentralization is the mother of all evils, that in a decentralized world
the fight for "common property" is exacerbated and that the “solution” must be in
the hands of a central planner. The greater the power of this central planner, the
better the fiscal results obtained. If in this context decentralization is required it
must be simply understood as “deconcentration” or “delegation” (Bird, 1995).
The central planner is the “principal” who tells “agents” how much to spend and
on what, how much to tax and how (what taxes, bases and tax-rates), etc. Because
at the central level there are several actors the message seems to be that the best
solution is an Executive that prevails over Congress, a dominant Finance Minister
in the Executive, a Congress dominated by the President’s political party and so
on. In this political scenario, good fiscal results would be obtained.4
In a third kind of model of fiscal decentralization the political institutions of
each society have a central role together with democratic mechanisms for decision
making (ballot box). Rather than the “general case,” it is emphasized that each
society solves in a different way both its political and fiscal organizations. “One
4 In the Argentine case, these political scenarios do not generate good fiscal results. The
closest example to the description of the text is the government elected between 1946 and
1955 and the "de facto" government between 1976 and 1983.
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cannot pick an institution from a specific setting, plant it in the alien soil of another
environment, and expect to obtain the same result. The choice of perspective is
thus essential in approaching issues of fiscal decentralization.”5 To evaluate fiscal
decentralization it is necessary to distinguish whether you put the focus on the
intrinsic or on the instrumental aspects of the subject.  The centralist model looks
at fiscal decentralization from an instrumental point of view and the judgement is
negative due to excessive expenditures, excessive public debt, macroeconomic
catastrophes, etc. The alternative view looks at the intrinsic value of
decentralization. “Local people may make wrong decisions from the perspective
of an outside observer, but if they make them, the decision must, by definition, be
assumed to be right for them. From this perspective, then, decentralization is
intrinsically good because it institutionalizes the participation of those affected by
local decisions. The results of a good process must themselves be good” (Bird,
1995). The recent literature puts another plus for fiscal federalism and ballot-box:
the positive impact on citizens’ happiness (Frey and Stutzer, 1999).6
III. Fiscal Decentralization in Practice
Two important questions for the analysis of fiscal decentralization are:
A) Which are the conditions for the efficient working of fiscal decentralization?
B) If we trust in democratic mechanisms (the ballot box and the political institutions
of each country) for fiscal decision-making and control, which fiscal variables
5 In general, this vision could be applied to all fiscal policies. Related to models of political
economy and the requirements of budget rules, Romer (1997) in a comment to Poterba
(1997) suggests that "the adoption of balanced budget requirement could do anything from
significantly worsening a country's fiscal problems to leading to their gradual solution.
Determining where in this range of possibilities the truth lies is of great importance for
public policy and social welfare.”
6 “Federal decentralization, and in particular local autonomy, is another constitutional
element which can be hypothesized to positively affect citizens’ happiness. Political decision
making in municipalities is closer to relevant information about residents’ preferences and
also closer to direct control by its citizens” (Frey and Stutzer, 1999).
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do consumers-voters take into consideration when they vote? Which fiscal
variables should politicians attend to if they wish to win the following election?
A) Conditions for Efficient Working of Local Governments and Fiscal
Decentralization
As it is expressed in Oates (1994: 126) “the public sector in the real world,
however, consists of a set of institutions –and spending and tax programs are
enacted and function within this context.” Tiebout (1956) also expresses this worry.
The question that arises is whether there is a set of social institutions, which could
lead to an efficient allocation of resources in the public sector. In general, the
conditions for the efficient functioning of local governments –fiscal
decentralization– are (Bahl y Linn, 1994; Bird y Rodriguez, 1995):
(a) local authorities chosen through democratic mechanisms;
(b) tradition and culture in local decisions-making;
(c) well-qualified, trained and professional bureaucracy;
(d) relative balance in the regional distribution of income and wealth; or
incorporation of regional disparities as a desirable goal of fiscal policies;7
(e) effective or yardstick competition.
B) The Relevant Fiscal Variables
An important issue is whether citizens “look at” variables of fiscal performance
when they vote and, if they do, which variables they consider. Conversely, we
need to discover if politicians take these variables into account. It is hard to find
an absolute answer. Probably different societies, different levels of government,
different moments or circumstances will influence the relevant variables for citizens
and politicians.
7  In the Argentine case, as in the case of other countries, another condition that could be
added is that "properties rights" over fiscal resources have to be clearly defined. This has
to be done after an open discussion in the society about what the different levels of
government are doing and what they have done with the money.
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The analysis of the citizen-voters response to fiscal variables is based on a
simple model following Peltzman (1987, 1990, 1992, 1998) and Besley and Case
(1995). Two comments are necessary. In the first place, it is supposed that voting
is used to discipline the political party in office. Secondly, it is assumed that
consumer-voters are able to evaluate the performance of the political party in
office and that this evaluation is made using available information from the
municipality where they live. Such assessment is made considering the impact of
the activities of the municipal public sector on the utility (U). The change in utility
due to the fiscal policy of the political party in office may be positive or negative
and it depends on the change in municipal fiscal variables. This change and the
evaluation is made by consumer-voters ex post, that is, the assessment is based on
past performance. Voters take the change in utility into account to decide whether
or not to re-elect the incumbent party. There is a function f (U), with f’ < 0, that
transforms the variation in utility in probability to change the political party in
office. The transformation is made with a function
Vi = Ai + b Ui + c Pi + d Yi
Ui = g (Xi)   (1)
where Vi is the probability to change the political party in office in the municipality
i; Ai is a constant indicating the “normal” probability of change explained by other
variables (e.g. that citizens prefer rotation in the office per se, etc.); Ui is function
of the change in municipal fiscal variables (Xi); Pi is the population in i; Yi is the
change in income per capita in i.
The dependent variable in Peltzman’s model for the United States is the
incumbent party’s share of the vote in jurisdiction i. In his 1987 paper he obtained
several results of interest for our research. Firstly, voters, in gubernatorial elections,
understand that national rather than local policies have the dominant effect on the
change of income per capita. Secondly, voters respond to local fiscal variables
under the governors’ control. Thirdly, voters use their vote to penalize the growth
of the state budget. Finally, voters consider the four-year percentage change in the
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fiscal variable –what suggests that the role of the voters’ memory is more significant
than often assumed. Peltzman’s 1990 paper confirms some of the previous findings
and some new ones are worth mentioning. For example, it is particularly important
to notice that Peltzman finds ex-post settlement between principals (voters) and
agents (political parties). Another important result is that voters reward only
permanent improvement in their welfare, that is, they do not reward a policy that
increases their welfare prior to the election and reduces it after the election. In
Peltzman (1992) the analysis is extended to the direct effect of the fiscal policy.
He offers evidence in support of four conclusions: first, that voters penalize growth
both in federal and state expenditures; second, that the composition of state budget
matters, though not that of the federal budget; third, that the way spending is
financed does not matter at a political level; and finally, that the voting market
shows considerable learning within a relatively short interval.
For the re-election of governors in the USA, the most important variable seems
to be the level of compared taxation. Besley and Case (1995) have shown that
voters choose whether to re-elect governors based “on their performance while in
office.” For this purpose, citizens compare such performance with that of neighbours
(“yardstick competition”). Moreover, if some policies lead to electoral success,
one could hypothesize that such policies would spread, with the consequence that
the “voters’ choice and incumbent behaviour are determined simultaneously.” The
importance of this study lies in the fact that, regardless of the fiscal variable
considered, there is a relationship between fiscal performance (in this study, relative)
and electoral result. Democracy “matters” and affects the decisions of politicians.
Politicians, knowing how citizens behave, are encouraged to adopt the fiscal
measures that citizens deem appropriate. The democratic mechanism, together
with the mobility of goods, factors, and people, may lead to good fiscal results
without the need to resort to centralized solutions. In Besley and Case’s model,
the functioning is as follows: if one governor increases taxes and neighbouring
governors do not, there is a strong likelihood that citizens will vote against him in
the following election, in which case he will not be re-elected. The governor is
knowledgeable of how citizens vote and checks that his tax level is not significantly
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different from that of his neighbours. For Argentina, Gasparini (1997) also finds
evidence of municipal interrelationships in tax policy. It could be objected that
this mechanism may result in the sub-production of local public goods and a mix
far from optimum. The answer resides in the fact that the same competition exists
for expenditures (Case, Hines and Rosen, 1993; Porto, 1995), what will act as a
balancing mechanism. The important conclusion is that, considering both taxes
and expenditures, citizens vote in the ballot box and politicians consider their
opinions in implementing policies.8 9
In an analysis of the principles of local taxing, Spahn (1995: 222-23) also
emphasizes the interaction between voters and politicians. “Local politicians should
be responsive to the expressed preferences of their local citizens or expect to
encounter defeat in local elections.  This is the basic principle of accountability of
local policymakers, and it is essential both for economic efficiency and democratic
representation.” A central issue for the good functioning of the political system is
the information made available for the community. “Information policies are crucial
for a decentralized government. Information is necessary to make co-ordination
effective, and inform the national governments and its voters (...). It is also important
to estimulate competence between jurisdictions and thus encourage innovations”
Spahn (1997: 227-228).
IV. Voters’Choices as Control of Fiscal Variables
The Argentine experience since the return to democracy in 1983 offers some
interesting results. The 125 municipalities of the province of Buenos Aires and
the four elections at this level (1983, 1987, 1991, 1995) are considered. Given the
initial situation (result of the 1983 election), three important questions arise:
i) Has the political affiliation of municipal officials changed since 1983? If so, in
what proportion?
8 One of the weakness of our paper is to leave aside the simultaneity in the relationship
between voters and politicians (see footnote 11).
9 For an interesting review of the literature in relation with fiscal competition, see Schulze
and Upsrung (1999). We obtained this reference from Prof. Schulze.
145FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND VOTERS’ CHOICES AS CONTROL
ii) Did the citizens’ voting behavior vary depending on the type of election
(municipal officials, governor, president)?
iii) Are the results of elections related to the fiscal performance of governments?
Results indicate that in the 1987 election 37 municipalities changed political
party (29,6 %); in 1991, 36 (28,8 %); and in 1995, 39 (31,12 %). The average of
changes for the three elections is 29,9 %. The main finding is that about one third
of the municipal officials elected belong to a different political party from the one
in office after each election. Elections at the municipal level coincide with elections
of provincial authorities. Data show that there is vote discrimination (governor vs.
municipal official). In 1987, of the 37 changes in municipal officials, 92%
corresponded to the political party of the governor elected; in 1991, the percentage
decreased to 64%; and in 1995 to 56%. This suggests, in the first place, that for
this specific case, it is not true that “local elections, when they exists, are usually
decided on the basis of personal, tribal, or political party loyalties (...) local elections
are often a mere rehearsal of national elections and say little about local preferences”
(Prud’homme, 1995: 208). In the second place, that there is learning in the ballot
box mechanism. Only in 1983 and 1995 did elections at the three levels coincide.
Although in 1995 the President and the Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires
belonged to the same party, there were changes in 39 municipalities. This election
is particularly interesting because changes occurred in both directions: the UCR
political party (Unión Civica Radical) lost 18 municipalities and the PJ political
party (Partido Justicialista) 15; the UCR political party won 13 and the PJ political
party 22 (Tables 1 to 3).
Considering the three elections, the highest percentage of changes in the political
affiliation of officials in municipalities (46 %) was recorded in the less populated
areas. Conversely, the lowest percentage (19 %) corresponded to more populated
districts. This suggests that the smaller the size of the population, the higher the
probability of changes in the political color of authorities. This result can be
explained by recourse to the argument that in a small community citizens are more
sensitive to the performance of officials in government and that individual votes
have strong power (Table 4).
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Table 1. Political Parties between Levels of Government 1983, 1987, 1989,
1991 and 1995
President Governor                      Municipalities
Number Percentage
1983




                                                           1987




                                                           1989




                                                           1991




                                                           1995




Source: Estadística Bonaerense (1996) and information of the Junta Electoral of the Province
of Buenos Aires. PJ = political party Justicialista. UCR = political party Unión Cívica Radical.
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Table 2. Municipal Elections 1987, 1991 y 1995
Number and Percentage of Municipalities
1987
Change in the political party 37 (29,6 %) 33 no longer UCR
No change in the political party 88 (70,4 %) 2 no longer PJ 35 become PJ
Total 125 (100 %) 2 no longer Other 2 become Other
1991
Change in the political party 36 (28,8 %) 25 no longer UCR 7 become UCR
No change in the political party 89 (71,2 %) 8 no longer PJ 23 become PJ
Total 125 (100 %) 3 no longer Other 6 become Other
 1995
Change in the political party 39 (31,2 %) 18 no longer UCR 13 become UCR
No change in the political party 86 (68,8 %) 15 no longer PJ 22 become PJ
Total 125 (100 %) 6 no longer Other 4 become Other
Average years 1987, 1991 y 1995
Change in the political party 37,33 (29,9 %) 25,33 no longer UCR 6,67 become UCR
No change in the political party 87,67 (70,1 %) 8,33 no longer PJ 26,67 become PJ
Total 125,00 (100%) 3,67 no longer Other 3,33 become Other
Source: Estadística Bonaerense (1996) and information of the Junta Electoral of the Province of Buenos Aires.
PJ = political party Justicialista. UCR = political party Unión Cívica Radical. Other = political parties different from
PJ and UCR.
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Table 3. Changes in Political Party of the Municipalities.  Relationship with the
Political Party of the Governor
1987 1991 1995
1. Municipalities in which change the political party (1) 37 36 39
1.1. The winning political party is that of the Governor (1) 34 23 22
Percentage of  number of changes 91,89 63,89 56,41
Percentage of number of Municipalities 27,20 18,40 17,60
1.2. The winning political party is different of that of the
Governor (0) 3 13 17
Percentage of  number of changes 8,11 36,11 43,59
Percentage of number of Municipalities 2,40 10,40 13,60
2. Municipalities in which not change the political
party (0) 88 89 86
2.1. The winning political party is that of the Governor  (1) 27 53 61
Percentage of  number of changes 30,68 59,55 70,93
Percentage of number of Municipalities 21,60 42,40 48,80
2.2. The winning political party is different of that
of the Governor (0) 61 36 25
Percentage of  number of changes 69,32 40,45 29,07
Percentage of number of Municipalities 48,80 28,80 20,00
Total of Municipalities 125 125 125
Source: Estadística Bonaerense (1996) and information of the Junta Electoral of the Province
of Buenos Aires.
To answer the third question,  three fiscal variables were selected for the analysis
of  the  relationship between results in elections and fiscal performance:  first, the
porcentual  change in the per capita provincial grants to the municipality after the
last  election (at constant terms);  second, the change for the same period in the
per capita total expenditures; and third, the change  for  the  same period in the
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Table 4. Changes in the Political Party of the Municipalities and the Size of
Population
Electoral Population 1991 Number of Number of Percentage
section (thousands) Municipalities changes of changes
1987/1991/1995 per election
First 4268 20 16 26,67
Second 592 15 13 28,89
Third 4522 16 9 18,75
Fourth 542 18 15 27,78
Fifth 1079 26 26 33,33
Sixth 677 21 23 36,51
Seventh 241 8 9 37,50
Eighth 528 1 1 33,33
Total 12449 125 115 30,67
Source: Estadística Bonaerense (1996) and information of the Junta Electoral of the Province
of Buenos Aires.
10 For example, the porcentual change in any variable between the average 1984-1986 and
1983.
11 Despite the fact that there could be some evidence that those selected variables could be
endogenous ones leading to bias estimation problems, there is no more municipal
information available to take this problem into account. So, we prefer to take in mind the
bias generated by endogeneity rather than another one generated by wrong estimations.
12 We investigated if the change in provincial grants to each Municipality is influenced by
the decisions of political parties at the provincial level. To this aim, we used the Wilcoxon
test to investigate whether the distribution of the changes in provincial grants in the
per capita public investments of the municipality.10 11 People, it is supposed,
consider provincial grants because the more the municipality obtains, ceteris
paribus, the less taxes they will have to pay, or the more goods they will get for
the same taxes.12 They also consider, one can assume, total expenditures since the
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higher the expenditures, the higher the taxes to finance them. People supposedly
observe public investment at the municipal level because it affects daily life: public
lightening, traffic lights, roads, and urban infrastructure in general. This kind of
expenditure represents a permanent improvement in individuals’ welfare. As a
control variable, we add the size of the population taking into account that the
smaller the community, the more sensitive citizens will be to the performance of
authorities in government and the more powerful individual votes will be (the
power of votes is 1/N, where N is the population).13 14 We also include two proxy
variables for the changes in income per capita: the change in the consumption of
home electricity per capita and the change in the number of cars per capita. Lack
of data on the evolution of personal income led us to use these proxies.
Table 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 describe the variables and present a summary of the
basic statistical results. The tables show that, in the three periods, the average
variation in capital expenditures was higher for the subgroup of municipalities
where the political party did not change. Higher average variations for provincial
grants and total municipal expenditures were also observed, even though the
differences are not so marked as in the case of capital expenditures. There are two
interesting things to note. First, that where the political party changed, the average
population was always smaller; second, that information for the 1995 election
Municipalities with the same political party as the Governor’s equals the changes in
Municipalities with different political party from the Governor’s. The results reveal that,
for the three periods, the variable shows similar distributions. The average variation did
not differ significantly either. We appreciate Streb’s suggestion in this respect.
13 We also use a number of control variables such us unsatisfied basic needs, education of
human resources, fiscal capacity, human development, etc. The results were not very different
from the ones presented and are omitted for simplicity.
14 Following one suggestion from Streb, we included in our analysis a term to catch the
interaction between fiscal variables and population. We defined this interaction term as
“fiscal perception” which amounts to the division of each fiscal variable by the population
of each Municipality (fiscal perception = fiscal variable/N). This new variable neither
improved the estimations nor illuminated further conclusions.
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Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics. 1987
Capital Total Provincial Population
expenditures expenditures grants
Municipalities with no change in the political party (87)
Mean 102,95 23,55 45,73 105,78
Standard deviation 416,36 25,14 35,83 184,29
Maximum 3425,98 102,23 217,21 1117,32
Minimum -87,76 -24,04 -53,44 1,43
Municipalities with change in the political party (38)
Mean 6,53 17,43 42,28 86,28
Standard deviation 70,36 22,40 28,13 147,26
Maximum 233,95 82,87 101,27 637,31
Minimum -80,55 -19,58 -41,98 6,96
Table 5.2. Descriptive Statistics. 1991
Capital Total Provincial Population
expenditures expenditures grants
Municipalities with no change in the political party (88)
Mean -20,18 -16,49 8,78 107,62
Standard deviation 56,08 14,49 32,17 188,15
Maximum 204,94 39,46 159,67 1117,32
Minimum -93,14 -43,68 -66,67 1,43
Municipalities with change in the political party (37)
Mean -32,07 -17,78 2,78 81,39
Standard deviation 41,65 12,11 27,95 132,86
Maximum 121,96 19,87 128,43 527,76
Minimum -79,73 -37,54 -41,98 6,96
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Table 5.3. Descriptive Statistics. 1995
Capital Total Provincial Efficiency Energy Cars Pop.
expend. expend. grants
Municipalities with no change in the political party (85)
Mean 141,86 29,54 24,82 0,02 21,54 89,00 123,48
Standard deviation 228,12 19,07 22,89 0,27 16,03 410,90 197,24
Maximum 1429,02 107,07 142,95 1,13 73,54 2761,11 1117,32
Minimum -52,88 -6,99 -34,13 -0,84 -19,89 -19,34 2,84
Municipalities with change in the political party (40)
Mean 56,88 25,72 21,80 -0,05 17,50 37,47 49,65
Standard deviation 77,65 17,28 22,31 0,29 14,29 91,67 90,15
Maximum 273,91 62,05 102,50 0,42 83,87 575,80 524,23
Minimum -57,71 -8,00 -5,97 -0,65 -8,07 -9,66 1,43
Capital  expenditures:  variation  of  capital  expenditures  per  capita  between  1983
(1987/1991) and the average of 1984-86 (1988-90/1992-94).
Total expenditures: variation of total expenditures per capita between 1983 (1987/1991)
and the average of 1984-86 (1988-90/1992-94).
Provincial grants: variation of provincial grants per capita between 1983 (1987/1991) and
the average of 1984-86 (1988-90/1992-94).
Population: population census 1991.
Efficiency measure of efficiency of Municipalities (1995).
Energy: variation of consumption of home electricity per capita between 1991 and the
average of  1992-94.
Cars: variation of cars per capita between 1991 and the average of  1992-94.
Source: Estadística Bonaerense. (1996). Information of the Junta Electoral of the Province
of Buenos Aires.
15 We use the Wilcoxon test to investigate whether the distributions of variables in the
Municipalities with changes in the political party in office are equal to those in Municipalities
without changes. The tests show more similar distributions for 1987 and 1991 than for
1995. In 1995, five of seven variables show different distributions
showed -in average- less efficacy in fiscal performance and worse general economic
conditions in the municipalities with changes.15
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We used the logit regression method to analyze the changes in political parties
in the Municipalities of the province of Buenos Aires. In this case, the dependent
variable is a binary variable, which takes two values depending on the change –or
not– of the political party in office after an election. The variable is valued one if the
political party changes in an election and zero otherwise. Three different elections
were analyzed, corresponding to 1987, 1991, and 1995 (Model I.1., Table 6.1.)
The results for the 1987 election show that there is no individual significance
for any of the independent variables (investment is the most significant individual
variable, at 20 %). In addition, there is not overall significance of the model. The
signs are as expected for the grants (the less the grants, the higher the probability
of change in political party), for the investment (the less the investment, the higher
the probability of change in political party) and the population (the less the
population, the higher the probability of change in political party –the less
perception of fiscal variables or the less power of individual votes), but not for the
total expenditures.
The results for the 1991 election are similar to those of the 1987 election.
They also show that there is no individual significance for any of the independent
variables (as before, investment is significant at 20 %) and that there is not overall
significance of the model. However, for 1991 some results are worth noticing: all
individual variables have the expected sign, and the test of individual significance
improves with respect to the previous model.
Finally, the results for the cross-section of the 1995 election are even more
valuable. The model as a whole is significant. The signs for the four variables are
as expected. Of all individual variables, capital expenditures and population are
the most significant in statistical terms (4 %), while total expenditures and grants
are still not significant. Some interesting results were obtained from other
estimations for the 1995 election (Table 6.2.). We added one variable for the
efficiency of the municipal government (real versus estimated output with a Cobb-
Douglas function),16 for which we expect a negative sign: the greater the municipal
16 A  measure  of  efficiency  was  obtained comparing the estimated and real output for
each municipality using a Cobb-Douglas function. Details can be seen in Brambilla et.al.
(1998).
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Table 6.1. Probability Models for Elections in 1987, 1991 y 1995
Elections 1987 (1) Elections 1991 (2) Elections 1995 (3)
Model I.1. Model I.2. Model I.1. Model I.2. Model I.1. Model I.2.
Variation of capital expenditures -0,68 -0,47 -1,90 -1,93 -1,13 -1,07
(-1,31)*** (-0,89) (-1,34)*** (-1,36)*** (-2,14)* (-2,01)*
Variation of total expenditures -0,17 -1,65 3,71 3,67 2,72 2,21
(-0,07) (-0,81) (0,79) (0,78) (0,92) (0,73)
Variation of provincial grants -0,74 0,32 -1,12 -1,22 -1,22 -1,17
(-0,61) (0,28) (-0,74) (-0,81) (-0,59) (-0,57)
Population -0,13 -0,41 -0,39 -0,43 -0,92 -0,88
(-0,55) (-2,13)* (-1,32)*** (-1,43)*** (-2,24)* (-2,14)*
Dummy 0,48 0,07 -0,07
(5,23)* (0,84) (-0,90)
Constant -0,10 -0,35 -0,13 -0,17 -0,03 0,02
(-1,32)*** (-3,54)* (-1,64)** (-1,81)** (-0,38) (0,20)
Overall significance 6,03 54,05 4,83 5,54 15,56 16,37
Log likelihood -72,91 -48,90 -72,63 -72,28 -69,80 -69,40
Goodness of fit 0,70 0,78 0,71 0,71 0,70 0,68
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 125
Model I.2. includes a dummy variable values 1 if the political party in Municipalities coincides
with the political party of the Governor and 0 otherwise.
Coefficients are multiplied by 1.000 (except those of the constant and the dummy).
The values in parenthesis present the value of statistic z (* 5 % significant; ** 10 % significant;
*** 20 % significant).
The test of overall significance corresponds to statistic x2. The critical value at 5 % for regressions
(1), (2) y (3) is 9,49 (model I.1.) y 11,07 (model I.2.).
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Table 6.2. Probability Models for Elections in 1995
Elections 1995 (4) Elections 1995 (5) Elections 1995 (6)
Model I.1. Model I.2. Model I.1. Model I.2. Model I.1. Model I.2.
Variation of capital expenditures -1,09 -1,02 -1,1 -1,03 -1,16 -1,10
(-2,04)* (-1,91)** (-2,04)* (-1,89)** (-2,18)* (-2,05)*
Variation of total expenditures 2,50 1,96 2,62 2,07 2,67 2,13
(0,85) (0,65) (0,88) (0,68) (0,90) (0,70)
Variation of provincial grants  -1,62 -1,61 -1,16 -1,08 -1,09 -1,05
(-0,77) (-0,77) (-0,56) (-0,52) (-0,53) (-0,51)
Population -0,91 -0,87 -0,92 -0,88 -0,84 -0,81
(-2,19)* (-2,09)* (-2,24)* (-2,14)* (-2,02)* (-1,94)**
Municipal efficiency -132,26 -139,90
(-0,92) (-0,97)
Variation of automobiles -0,05 -0,06
(-0,26) (-0,29)
Variation of energy consumption -2,23 -2,24
(-0,84) (-0,85)
Dummy -0,08 -0,07 -0,07
(-0,96) (-0,91) (-0,91)
Constant -0,02 0,03 -0,03 0,02 0,08 0,06
(-0,28) (0,33) (-0,36) (0,23) (0,08) (0,55)
Overall significance 16,42 17,33 15,64 16,48 16,29 17,12
Log likelihood -69,38 -68,92 -69,76 -69,35 -69,44 -69,03
Goodness of fit 0,70 0,70 0,70 0,69 0,68 0,70
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 125
Model I.2. includes a dummy variable values 1 if the political party in Municipalities coincides with
the political party of the Governor and 0 otherwise.
Coefficients are multiplied by 1.000 (except those of the constant and the dummy).
(4) Regression for 1995 period including a variable of Municipal efficiency.
(5) Regression for 1995 period including a variable of variation of automobiles per capita.
(6) Regression for 1995 period including a variable of variation of consumption of residential energy
per capita.
The values in parenthesis present the value of statistic z (* 5 % significant; ** 10 % significant; ***
20 % significant).
The test of overall significance corresponds to statistic x2. The critical value at 5 % for regressions
(4), (5) y (6) is 11,07 (model I.1.) y 12,59 (model I.2.).
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efficiency, the less the probability of change in the political party. The sign is as
expected but not significant. The change in general economic conditions does not
have a significant effect on municipal elections. Following Peltzman we would
say that voters understand that their personal income (or proxies) is affected by
national or provincial policies rather than municipal policies.
From the analysis of the three periods separately, it becomes evident that the
model is increasingly significant as one moves in time, with overall significance
for the 1995 election. The significance of individual variables follows a similar
pattern. An interesting example is the variation in per capita capital expenditures.
This is the only fiscal variable that is significant on its own  in  the  third  period
(4 %). As it happens with the overall significance of the model, the tests show that
this variable is increasingly useful. The variation in total expenditures and
provincial grants, though not individually significant, have the expected signs and,
as one moves in time, the coefficients tend towards individual relevance.
Some interesting results arise when we add, for each election, a dummy variable
which distinguishes whether the winning party in the Municipality is the same (1)
or different (0) from the Governor`s party. This variable is only significant in the
1987 election and when it is included, the total estimation improves. For this
election, the positive sign shows that the probability of change is higher if the
Governor’s political party is challenging in the Municipalities. This result reveals
that the 1987 municipal elections were deeply influenced by the results of the
provincial election. The dummy variable is not significant in the other elections
(Model I.2., Tables 6.1 and 6.2).
Several interpretations are possible. First, results suggest that after a learning
period, citizens vote considering the fiscal performance of municipal authorities.
Our study suggests that citizens interpret bad fiscal performance as evidence that
their political party is unqualified for the position and unseat it in the next election.
Only in 1987 were municipal electoral outcomes influenced by the provincial
election. Second, the smaller the jurisdiction, the more sensitive the citizens. Third,
citizens use information related with the years prior to the election. Voters, in
evaluating fiscal performance to take voting decisions, consider the performance
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in the recent past as a benchmark. Finally, it is the changes in the fiscal variables
that affect votes. Our findings reveal that the electoral performance of one
jurisdiction depends upon the jurisdiction’s own fiscal policy; that voters seem to
understand who (national, provincial or municipal governments) is responsible
for what policy; that the possibility of “looking” is verified for the variables that
are palpable for citizens (e.g. capital expenditures), with a permanent effect on
their welfare. Those citizens would penalize the growth in total expenditures and
would reward provincial grants and municipal efficiency. These results are
congruent with Peltzman’s. One additional conclusion is that the increase in
municipal information, both from a citizen’s municipality and the neighbouring
municipalities (yardstick competition), may contribute to improve the performance
of municipal governments. Finally, looking for new and appropriate political
institutions like direct democracy may also benefit performance and happiness as
several studies for other countries suggest (Pommerehne and Weck, 1996; Frey,
1997; Feld and Savioz, 1997).17 Results, though preliminary, seem to show that it
is possible to trust in fiscal decentralization and the democratic mechanism.
The previous analysis was based on cross-section specifications where the
observable units are the Municipalities in three different elections. Now, as an
additional instrument, we use the panel data structure. The fundamental advantage
of a panel data set over the cross-section is that it allows great flexibility in modeling
differences in behaviour across Municipalities and/or over time. In this case, our
main objective is to analyze the intertemporal evolution of the coefficients. To
this aim, we suggest two models for the analysis of the panel data structure. Firstly,
we used a model (Model II, Table 7) to estimate homogeneous parameters for the
whole Municipalities, without distinguishing between intermunicipal or
intertemporal differences. We suppose that parameters do not change either between
Municipalities or along time. Secondly, we used a model (Model III, Table 8)
17  The reform of 1994 in the Constitution of the Province of Buenos Aires introduces
forms of direct democracy that we hope will help to improve the functioning of the municipal
sector. Until now it was used only once in only one Municipality.
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which allowed us to estimate homogeneous parameters for all Municipalities,
distinguishing only intertemporal differences. For this, we suppose that the
parameters may change only along time (not between Municipalities).
In Model II, the signs of the variables (capital expenditures, total expenditures,
provincial grants and population) are as expected both with and without the
dummy variable.  They are all individually significant at 5 or 10 % (except for
the provincial grants).  The  coefficient of the dummy variable is positive and it
is significant at 5 %.  Both specifications of Model II are significant as a whole.
Model III, which imposes the hypothesis of intermunicipal homogeneity of the
parameters, shows us that for most cases, the variables have the same signs as
those found in Model I when we considered the three periods separately. In
addition, the individual significance of each of the variables is very close to that
we  found  in Model I.  As  in  the  case of Model II, both specifications of
Model III (with and without the dummy variable) are significant as a whole. In
brief, Model II reveals expected signs for the variables, individual significance
for all of them (except for provincial grants) and overall significance of the model
as a whole. Model III shows that in most cases the signs of the variables are as
expected, the model as a whole is significant, and the variables which are
individually significant are the same as those in Model I.
Our next step is to compare these two models using a likelihood ratio test to
see the significance of a group of coefficients. We compare the likelihood of one
restricted model (in this case, Model II) with the likelihood of another unrestricted
model (in this case, Model III). When the dummy variable is not considered as
another explicative variable, the test reveals that the models are very similar. But
things take a different direction when we include it, revealing a better functioning
of Model III.18 We think this result is in agreement with the learning process when
democracy returns.19
18 The likelihood ratio test is 2,66 for specifications of Model 1 (Model II.1 and III.1) and
40,44 for specifications of Model II (Model II.2 and III.2).
19 Another important issue is to test the presence of intermunicipal heterogeneity analyzing
fixed effects in the logit model by using the conditional logit method of Chamberlain. The
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Table 7. Intertemporal and Intermunicipal Homogeneity of Parameters
Model II.1. Model II.2.
Capital expenditures -1,03 -1,11
(-2,90)* (-3,10)*
Total expenditures 2,30 2,51
(1,82)** (1,98)*








Overall significance 20,57 34,72
Log likelihood -218,36 -211,29
Goodness of fit 69,60 70,40
Observations 375 375
Model II.2. includes a dummy variable values 1 if the political party in Municipalities coincides with
the political party of the Governor and 0 otherwise.
Coefficients are multiplied by 1.000 (except those of the constant and the dummy).
The values in parenthesis present the value of statistic z (* 5 % significant; ** 10 % significant; ***
20 % significant).
The test of overall significance corresponds to statistic x2. The critical value at 5 % for model II.1. is
9,49 and for model II.2. is 11,07.
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Table 8. Intermunicipal Homogeneity of Parameters
Model III.1. Model III.2.
Capital expenditures 1987 -0,73 -0,62
(-1,37)*** (-0,89)
Capital expenditures 1991 -1,88 -1,77
(-1,35)*** (-1,42)**
Capital expenditures 1995 -1,11 -0,96
(-2,09)* (-1,98)*
Total expenditures 1987 -0,20 -2,21
(-0,09) (-0,81)
Total expenditures 1991 3,68 3,45
(0,80) (0,83)
Total expenditures 1995 2,58 1,89
(0,86) (0,69)
Provincial grants 1987 -0,75 0,44
(-0,60) (0,28)
Provincial grants 1991 -1,11 -1,20
(-0,75) (-0,91)











Constant 1987 -0,07 -0,48
(-1,01) (-3,54)*
Constant 1991 -0,12 -0,14
(-1,68)** (-1,69)**
Constant 1995 -0,07 0,003
(-0,94) (0,04)
Overall significance 23,24 75,15
Log likelihood -217,03 -191,07
Goodness of fit 70,13 72,8
Observations 375 375
Model III.2. includes a dummy variable values 1 if the political party in Municipalities
coincides with the political party of the Governor and 0 otherwise.
Coefficients are multiplied by 1.000 (except those of the constant and the dummy).
The values in parenthesis present the value of statistic z (* 5 % significant; ** 10 %
significant; *** 20 % significant).
The test of overall significance corresponds to statistic x2. The critical value at 5 % for
model III.1. is 18,31 and for model III.2. is 22,36.
Table 8. (Continue) Intermunicipal Homogeneity of Parameters
Model III.1. Model III.2.
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V. Conclusions
This paper has investigated, empirically, the voters’ choices as a mechanism
of control of the municipal governments in the Province of Buenos Aires
(Argentina), where there are 125 municipalities with a population of 12,5 million
people (1991). In particular, the paper has explored the question of whether voters
choose to support the political party in office based on its fiscal performance
while in office. After the alternation of civil and military governments, democracy
prevails since 1983. In that period, there were four elections at the municipal
level. It has been argued that, when political processes are interrupted for a long
time and democracy returns -as in Argentina-, voters engage in a learning process
that, evidently, takes time.
This paper has sought answers for the following questions:
i) Has the political affiliation of municipal officials changed since 1983? If so, in
what proportion?
ii) Did the citizens’ voting behaviour vary depending on the type of election
(municipal officials, governor, president)?
iii) Are the results of elections related with the fiscal performance of governments?
Results indicate that in the 1987 election 37 municipalities changed political
party (29,6 %); in 1991, 36 (28,8 %); and in 1995, 39 (31,12 %). The average of
changes for the three elections is 29,9 %. Elections at the municipal level always
coincide with elections of provincial authorities and every twelve years with
presidential elections too. Data show that there is vote discrimination.
Three fiscal variables were selected for the analysis of the relationship between
results in elections and fiscal performance: first, the change in the per capita
provincial grants to the municipality after the last election; second, the change for
the same period in the per capita total expenditures; and third, the change for the
results show expected signs and individual significance of the variables. The Hausman test
shows that the null hypothesis of fixed effects is rejected in both specifications (with and
without the dummy variable). So, in this case, as we reject the hypothesis of the existence
of fixed effects, the logit estimator is consistent and efficient while the Chamberlain
estimator, though consistent, is inefficient.
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same period in the per capita public investments of the municipality. People, it is
supposed, consider provincial grants because the more the municipality obtains,
ceteris paribus, the less taxes they will have to pay, or the more goods they will get
for the same taxes. They also consider, one can assume, total expenditures since
the higher the expenditures, the higher the taxes to finance them. People supposedly
observe public investment at the municipal level because it affects daily life: public
lightening, traffic lights, roads, and urban infrastructure in general. As a control
variable, we add the size of the population taking into account that the smaller the
community, the more sensitive citizens will be to the performance of authorities in
government and the more powerful individual votes will be (the power of votes is
1/N, where N is the population). We also include a variable representing the changes
in general economic conditions (proxies of the changes in income per capita). We
also add a dummy variable in order to analyze the relationship between the political
party of the province and the political party of the municipalities.
We used the logit regression method where the dependent variable is a binary
variable valued one if the political party changes in an election and zero otherwise.
First, results suggest that after a learning period, citizens vote considering the
fiscal performance of municipal authorities. Our study suggests that citizens
interpret bad fiscal performance as evidence that their political party is unqualified
for the position and unseat it in the next election. Only in 1987 municipal electoral
outcomes were influenced by provincial election. Second, the smaller the
jurisdiction, the more sensitive the citizens. Third, citizens use information related
with the years prior to the election. Voters, in evaluating fiscal performance to
take voting decisions, consider the performance in the recent past as a benchmark.
Finally, it is the changes in the fiscal variables that affect votes. Our findings
reveal that the electoral performance of one jurisdiction depends upon the
jurisdiction’s own fiscal policy. They also suggest that voters seem to understand
who is responsible for what policy.
To conclude, preliminary results suggest that fiscal decentralization and the
democratic mechanisms, together with the mobility of goods and factors, can make
fiscal centralization less necessary than the models of political economy and several
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proposals for countries like Argentina suggest. If we add the impact of
decentralization on happiness we have another interesting plus.
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